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Abstract 
Keynes’ original intention in introducing the concept of a liquidity trap was to explain the 
reason why persistent large amounts of unutilized resources were generated during the Great 
Depression. This paper shows that this type of phenomenon cannot be explained in the 
framework of a traditional competitive market equilibrium. Instead, it can be understood in 
terms of a Nash equilibrium consisting of strategies of choosing a Pareto inefficient transition 
path because a Nash equilibrium can conceptually coexist with Pareto inefficiency. Such a Nash 
equilibrium will be selected when an upwards time preference shock occurs. At this Nash 
equilibrium, monetary policies are useless but fiscal policies are very effective as Keynes 
argued, but for different reasons. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The term “liquidity trap” has recently been used differently than Keynes (1936) originally 
intended. It seems to express an economic situation that has at least one of the following 
features: (1) nominal interest rates are nearly zero, (2) investments do not respond to very low 
nominal interest rates, and (3) monetary policies are significantly ineffective. Some authors 
emphasize feature (1) and others feature (3) (see, e.g., Krugman, 1998; Benhabib et al., 2001a, b, 
2002; Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003; Jeanne and Svensson, 2007; Eggertsson and Krugman, 
2012). Keynes’ (1936) original intention when introducing the concept of the liquidity trap was 
to explain the reason why persistent large amounts of unused resources (e.g., persistent high 
unemployment rates and large amounts of idle capital) were observed during the Great 
Depression in the 1930s. In this sense, merely stressing feature (1) would not be a correct usage 
of the term liquidity trap. An essential element is not very low nominal interest rates but the 
existence of large and persistent amounts of unused resources, a situation that was observed not 
only during the Great Depression but also in Japan’s lost decades in the 1990s and 2000s as well 
as the Great Recession beginning in 2008. If a large amount of resources is persistently not 
utilized, investments will not increase even though nominal interest rates are very low; thus, the 
economy will not respond to monetary policies. If very low nominal interest rates are the main 
cause of persistent large amounts of unused resources, feature (1) is important, but 
understanding why persistent large amounts of unused resources are generated and what counter 
measures are the most effective in fixing this problem are more important.  
 Keynes’ and his early followers’ explanation of persistent large amounts of unused 
resources is now viewed as basically unacceptable because it has no micro-foundation. 
New-Keynesians’ explanations are based on micro-founded mechanisms of some kinds of price 
rigidity, but they have not been regarded as sufficiently successful because price rigidity has 
been criticized for its fragile theoretical (micro-) foundation and its inability to explain the 
persistent nature of inflation. Mankiw (2001) argued that the so-called New-Keynesian Phillips 
curve is ultimately a failure and is not consistent with the standard stylized facts about the 
dynamic effects of monetary policy (see also, e.g., Fuhrer and Moore, 1995; Galí and Gertler, 
1999). In multi-equilibria, indeterminate, or sunspot models, a situation that satisfies at least one 
of the above three features can be generated (e.g., Benhabib and Farmer, 2000). For example, a 
zero interest rate equilibrium can possibly exist (Benhabib et al., 2001a., 2001b, 2002), and 
some models exhibit the existence of Pareto inferior and superior equilibria. Nevertheless, these 
multi-equilibria, indeterminate, or sunspot models have the common feature that markets are 
basically cleared in equlibria. Hence, they cannot demonstrate a mechanism by which persistent 
large amounts of unused resources are generated. So, if the focus is only on feature (1), these 
models may be useful, but they are not suitable for analyzing the economic situation Keynes 
originally intended to explain by using the liquidity trap concept.  
 This paper examines a mechanism by which persistent large amounts of unused 
resources can be generated and evaluates appropriate counter measures by taking a 
fundamentally different approach from New-Keynesian and multi-equilibria, indeterminate, or 
sunspot models. The mechanism is explained based on the model developed in Harashima 
(2004a, 2012, 2013b). The essential point of the model is that persistent large amounts of 
unused resources exist at a special Nash equilibrium that consists of strategies that generate 
Pareto inefficient payoffs. Moreover, they probably exist only at such an equilibrium if all 
agents are rational. In the framework of a traditional competitive market equilibrium, it is very 
difficult to show a rational mechanism that generates persistent large amounts of unused 
resources, that is, a persistent substantial Pareto inefficiency. One of a few ways to show such a 
mechanism in this framework is to assume some kinds of rigidity, particularly in prices. This 
approach was originally explored by Keynes, and since then, numerous studies have been 
devoted to this line of research. However, as Mankiw (2001) argued, this approach is not 
regarded as sufficiently successful. Humans are considered to be so clever and rational that they 
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cannot be cheated persistently; for example, they soon exploit the opportunities that price 
rigidities provide and price rigidity will thereby soon disappear. Unlike traditional competitive 
market equilibrium, however, a Nash equilibrium can conceptually coexist with Pareto 
inefficiency, and such a mechanism can exist without the need for rigidity. 
 A Nash equilibrium consisting of strategies of choosing a Pareto inefficient transition 
path of consumption to the steady state (hereafter called a “Nash equilibrium of a Pareto 
inefficient path”) is generated even in a frictionless economy if—and probably only if—the rate 
of time preference shifts. An essential reason for the generation of this path is that households 
are intrinsically risk averse and not cooperative. In a strategic environment, this generates the 
possibility that, if consumption needs to be substantially and discontinuously increased to keep 
Pareto optimality, a non-cooperative household’s strategy to deviate from the Pareto optimal 
path gives a higher expected utility than the strategy of choosing the Pareto optimal path.  
 The Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path should not be confused with a Pareto 
inferior Nash equilibrium or a Nash equilibrium that is Pareto inefficient. They are conceptually 
quite different, although the Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path discussed in this paper 
is both a Pareto inferior Nash equilibrium and a Nash equilibrium that is Pareto inefficient. 
Multiple equilibria resulting from, for example, increasing returns, an externality, or a 
complementarity in a macro-economic framework are usually Pareto ranked equilibria and 
include a Pareto inferior equilibrium (e.g., Morris and Shin, 2001). Such a Pareto inferior 
equilibrium usually indicates lower production and consumption than in a Pareto superior 
equilibrium, suggesting a recession. However, if consumption is immediately adjusted 
completely when the economy is switched from a Pareto superior equilibrium to the inferior one, 
unutilized resources will not be generated as a result of the switch; therefore, merely showing 
the possibility of multiple Pareto ranked equilibria is not sufficient to explain the generation 
mechanism of persistent Pareto inefficiency. A mechanism that generates huge and persistent 
unutilized resources during the transition path to the new equilibrium should also be presented, 
and the Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path fully explains this mechanism. 
 If households are cooperative, they will always proceed on Pareto efficient paths 
because they will coordinate with each other to perfectly utilize all resources. Conversely, if 
they do not coordinate with each other, they may strategically not utilize all resources; that is, 
they may select a Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path. Such a possibility cannot be 
denied a priori, because a Nash equilibrium can coexist with Pareto inefficiency. In fact, 
households are intrinsically not cooperative—they act independently of one another. Suppose 
that an upward shift of the time preference rate occurs. All households will be knocked off the 
Pareto efficient path on which they have proceeded prior to the shift. At that moment, each 
household must decide on a direction in which to proceed. Because they are no longer on a 
Pareto efficient path, households strategically choose a path on the basis of the expected utility 
calculated considering other households’ choices; that is, each household behaves 
non-cooperatively in its own interest considering other households’ strategies. This situation can 
be described by a non-cooperative mixed strategy game, and there is a Nash equilibrium of a 
Pareto inefficient path in this game. 
 This paper argues that the situation labeled as a liquidity trap is a Nash equilibrium of 
a Pareto inefficient path and, based on the nature of the Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient 
path, Keynes’ prescription for counter measures was right although his explanation of why they 
work was wrong. Although Keynes’ original arguments have been severely criticized, his 
prescription has been widely used by policymakers. This gap between theory and practice was 
still evident during the recent Great Recession. This paper shows that, as Keynes argued, 
monetary policies are useless, but fiscal policies are effective to counter a liquidity trap.  
 As a tool to finance fiscal policies, households are indifferent in the choice between 
tax increases and increased borrowing if the Barro–Ricardo equivalence theorem holds. 
However, this paper shows that the government may not be indifferent when choosing between 
the two if it is a Leviathan government.  
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows that a Nash equilibrium of a Pareto 
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inefficient path is rationally generated when the time preference rates of risk-averse and 
non-cooperative households shift. In Section 3, the effects of monetary policies when an 
economy is on a Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path are examined and evaluated. In 
Section 4, the effects of fiscal policies are examined and evaluated, and I also show that the 
types of fiscal policies to be selected will depend on the shape of the government’s utility 
function. Finally, I offer concluding remarks in Section 5. 
 
2  THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM OF A PARETO 
INEFFICIENT PATH 
 
2.1  Model with non-cooperative households 1 
2.1.1  The shock 
The model describes the utility maximization of households after an upward time preference 
shock. This shock was chosen because it is one of the few shocks that result in a Nash 
equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path (other possible shocks are discussed in Section 2.5). 
Another important reason for selecting an upward time preference shock is that it shifts the 
steady state to lower levels of production and consumption than before the shock, which is 
consistent with the phenomena actually observed in a recession.  
  Although the rate of time preference is a deep parameter, it has not been regarded as a 
source of shocks for economic fluctuations, possibly because the rate of time preference is 
thought to be constant and not to shift suddenly. There is also a practical reason, however. 
Models with a permanently constant rate of time preference exhibit excellent tractability (see 
Samuelson, 1937). However, the rate of time preference has been naturally assumed and 
actually observed to be time-variable. The concept of a time-varying rate of time preference has 
a long history (e.g., Böhm-Bawerk, 1889; Fisher, 1930). More recently, Lawrance (1991) and 
Becker and Mulligan (1997) showed that people do not inherit permanently constant rates of 
time preference by nature and that economic and social factors affect the formation of time 
preference rates. Their arguments indicate that many incidents can affect and change the rate of 
time preference throughout a person’s life. For example, Parkin (1988) examined business 
cycles in the United States, explicitly considering the time-variability of the time preference rate, 
and showed that the rate of time preference was as volatile as technology and leisure preference.  
 
2.1.2  Households 
Households are not intrinsically cooperative. Except in a strict communist economy, households 
do not coordinate themselves to behave as a single entity when consuming goods and services. 
The model in this paper assumes non-cooperative, identical, and infinitely long living 
households and that the number of households is sufficiently large. Each of them equally 
maximizes the expected utility 
 
   dtcuθtE t


0
0 exp  ,                         (1) 
 
subject to 
 
    ttt
t cδkkA,f
dt
dk
  ,                         (2) 
 
where yt, ct, and kt are production, consumption, and capital per capita in period t, respectively; 
                                                   
1 The model in Section 2 is based on the model by Harashima (2012). See also Harashima (2004a, 2013b). 
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A is technology and constant; u is the utility function;  tt kAfy ,  is the production 
function;   >θ 0 is the rate of time preference; δ is the rate of depreciation; and E0 is the 
expectations operator conditioned on the agents’ period 0 information set. yt, ct, and kt are 
monotonously continuous and differentiable in t, and u and f are monotonously continuous 
functions of ct and kt, respectively. All households initially have an identical amount of financial 
assets equal to kt, and all households gain the identical amount of income  tt kAfy ,  in each 
period. It is assumed that 
 
0
t
t
dc
cdu
 and 
 
0
2
2

t
t
dc
cud
; thus, households are risk averse. For 
simplicity, the utility function is specified to be the constant relative risk aversion utility 
function  
 
                             
γ
c
cu
γ
t
t



1
1
   if 1γ  
                               tt ccu ln    if 1γ  , 
 
where γ is a constant and  γ0 . In addition, 
 
0
,



t
t
k
kAf
 and 
 
0
2
2



t
t
k
kf
. Both 
technology (A) and labor supply are assumed to be constant. 
 The effects of an upward shift in time preference are shown in Figure 1. Suppose first 
that the economy is at steady state before the shock. After the upward time preference shock, the 
vertical line 0
dt
dct  moves to the left (from the solid vertical line to the dashed vertical line in 
Fig. 1). To keep Pareto efficiency, consumption needs to jump immediately from the steady 
state before the shock (the prior steady state) to point Z. After the jump, consumption proceeds 
on the Pareto efficient saddle path after the shock (the posterior Pareto efficient saddle path) 
from point Z to the lower steady state after the shock (the posterior steady state). Nevertheless, 
this discontinuous jump to Z may be uncomfortable for risk-averse households that wish to 
smooth consumption and not to experience substantial fluctuations. Households may instead 
take a shortcut and, for example, proceed on a path on which consumption is reduced 
continuously from the prior steady state to the posterior steady state (the bold dashed line in Fig. 
1), but this shortcut is not Pareto efficient. 
  Choosing a Pareto inefficient consumption path must be consistent with each 
household’s maximization of its expected utility. To examine the possibility of the rational 
choice of a Pareto inefficient path, the expected utilities between the two options need be 
compared. For this comparison, I assume that there are two options for each non-cooperative 
household with regard to consumption just after an upward shift in time preference. The first is 
a jump option, J, in which a household’s consumption jumps to Z and then proceeds on the 
posterior Pareto efficient saddle path to the posterior steady state. The second is a non-jump 
option, NJ, in which a household’s consumption does not jump but instead gradually decreases 
from the prior steady state to the posterior steady state, as shown by the bold dashed line in 
Figure 1. The household that chooses the NJ option reaches the posterior steady state in period 
 0s . The difference in consumption between the two options in each period t is bt (≥ 0). Thus, 
b0 indicates the difference between Z and the prior steady state. bt diminishes continuously and 
becomes zero in period s. The NJ path of consumption (ct) after the shock is monotonously 
continuous and differentiable in t and 0
dt
dct  if st 0 . In addition,  
 
                             
tt ccc ˆ    if st 0  
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                             cct        if ts 0  ,  
 
where tcˆ  is consumption when proceeding on the posterior Pareto efficient saddle path and c  
is consumption in the posterior steady state. Therefore, 
 
                          0ˆ  ttt ccb    if st 0  
                          0tb             if ts 0  . 
 
  It is also assumed that, when a household chooses a different option from the one the 
other households choose, the difference in the accumulation of financial assets resulting from 
the difference in consumption (bt) before period s between that household and the other 
households is reflected in consumption after period s. That is, the difference in the return on 
financial assets is added to (or subtracted from) the household’s consumption in each period 
after period s. The exact functional form of the addition (or subtraction) is shown in Section 
2.1.4. 
 
2.1.3  Firms 
Unutilized products (bt) are eliminated quickly in each period by firms because holding bt for a 
long period is a cost to firms. Elimination of bt is accomplished by discarding the goods or 
preemptively suspending production, thereby leaving some capital and labor inputs idle. 
However, in the next period, unutilized products are generated again because the economy is not 
proceeding on the Pareto efficient saddle path. Unutilized products are therefore successively 
generated and eliminated. Faced with these unutilized products, firms dispose of the excess 
capital used to generate bt. Disposing of the excess capital is rational for firms because the 
excess capital is an unnecessary cost, but this means that parts of the firms are liquidated, which 
takes time and thus disposing of the excess capital will also take time. If the economy proceeds 
on the NJ path (that is, if all households choose the NJ option), firms dispose of all of the 
remaining excess capital that generates bt and adjust their capital to the posterior steady-state 
level in period s, which also corresponds to households reaching the posterior steady state. Thus, 
if the economy proceeds on the NJ path, capital kt is 
 
                            
tt kkk
ˆ    if st 0  
                            kkt        if ts 0  , 
 
where tkˆ  is capital per capita when proceeding on the posterior Pareto efficient saddle path 
and k  is capital per capita in the posterior steady state. 
  The real interest rate it is  
 
 
t
t
t
k
kAf
i



,
 .                             (3) 
 
Because the real interest rate equals the rate of time preference at steady state, if the economy 
proceeds on the NJ path, 
 
                             θiθ t 
~
  if st 0  
                             θit       if ts 0  ,                         (4) 
 
where θ
~
 is the rate of time preference before the shock and θ  is the rate of time preference 
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after the shock. 
ti  is monotonously continuous and differentiable in t if st 0 . 
 
2.1.4  Expected utility after the shock 
The expected utility of a household after the shock depends on its choice of the J or NJ path. Let 
Jalone indicate that the household chooses option J, but the other households choose option NJ; 
NJalone indicate that the household chooses option NJ, but the other households choose option 
J; Jtogether indicate that all households choose option J; and NJtogether indicate that all 
households choose option NJ. Let p (0 ≤ p ≤ 1) be the subjective probability of a household that 
the other households choose the J option (e.g., p = 0 indicates that all the other households 
choose option NJ). With p, the expected utility of a household when it chooses option J is  
 
       JaloneEpJtogetherpEJE 000 1  ,                (5) 
 
and when it chooses option NJ is 
 
          N J t o g e t h e rEpN J a l o n epENJE 000 1  ,              (6) 
 
where  JaloneE0 ,  NJaloneE0 ,  JtogetherE0 , and  NJtogetherE0  are the expected 
utilities of the household when choosing Jalone, NJalone, Jtogether, and NJtogether, 
respectively. Given the properties of J and NJ shown in Sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3, 
 
         



  

s
t
s
tt dtcuθtdtbcuθtpEJE ˆexpexp
0
00
 
         



   
s
s
tt dtacuθtdtbcuθtEp
0
0 expexp1  ,      (7) 
 
and 
 
         



   
s
s
ttt dtacuθtdtcuθtpENJE
0
00
ˆexpexp  
         



  

s
s
t dtcuθtdtcuθtEp expexp1
0
0
 ,           (8) 
 
where 
 
 
s s
r
qr drdqibθa
0
exp  ,                       (9) 
 
and  
 
 
s s
r
qrtt drdqibia
0
exp  ,                      (10) 
 
and the shock occurred in period t = 0. Figure 2 shows the paths of Jalone and NJalone. 
Because there is a sufficiently large number of households and the effect of an individual 
household on the whole economy is negligible, in the case of Jalone, the economy almost 
proceeds on the NJ path. Similarly, in the case of NJalone, it almost proceeds on the J path. If 
the other households choose the NJ option (Jalone or NJtogether), consumption after s is 
constant as c  and capital is adjusted to k  by firms in period s. In addition, at and it are 
constant after s such that at equals a  and is equals θ, because the economy is at the posterior 
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steady state. Nevertheless, during the transition period before s, the value of it changes from the 
value of the prior time preference rate to that of the posterior rate. If the other households 
choose option J (NJalone or Jtogether), however, consumption after s is 
tcˆ  and capital is not 
adjusted to k  by firms in period s and remains at tkˆ . 
  As mentioned in Section 2.1.2, the difference in the returns on financial assets for the 
household from the returns for each of the other households is added to (or subtracted from) its 
consumption in each period after period s. This is described by at and a  in equations (7) and 
(8), and equations (9) and (10) indicate that the accumulated difference in financial assets 
resulting from bt increases by compound interest between the period r to s. That is, if the 
household takes the NJalone path, it accumulates more financial assets than each of the other J 
households, and instead of immediately consuming these extra accumulated financial assets 
after period s, the household consumes the returns on them in every subsequent period. If the 
household takes the Jalone path, however, its consumption after s is ac  , as shown in 
equation (7). a  is subtracted because the income of each household,  tt kAfy , , including 
the Jalone household, decreases equally by bt. Each of the other NJ households decreases 
consumption by bt at the same time, which compensates for the decrease in income; thus, its 
financial assets (i.e., capital per capita; kt) are kept equal to tkˆ . The Jalone household, however, 
does not decrease its consumption, and its financial assets become smaller than those of each of 
the other NJ households, which results in the subtraction of a  after period s. 
 
2.2  Pareto inefficient transition path 2 
2.2.1  Rational Pareto inefficient path  
2.2.1.1  Rational choice of a Pareto inefficient path 
Before examining the economy with non-cooperative households, I first show that, if 
households are cooperative, only option J is chosen as the path after the shock because it gives a 
higher expected utility than option NJ. Because there is no possibility of Jalone and NJalone if 
households are cooperative, then    JtogetherEJE 00   and    NJtogetherENJE 00  . 
Therefore,  
 
     NJEJE 00   
                



 



  

s
s
t
s
t
s
tt dtcuθtdtcuθtEdtcuθtdtbcuθtE expexpˆexpexp
0
0
0
0
 
                 0ˆe xpe xp
0
0  

s
t
s
ttt dtcucuθtdtcubcuθtE   
 
because 
ttt bcc   and tcc ˆ . 
  Next, I examine the economy with non-cooperative households. First, the special case 
with a utility function with a sufficiently small γ is examined.  
 
Lemma 1: If   γγ 0  is sufficiently small, then     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE .  
Proof:     NJtogetherEJaloneE
γ
00
0
lim 

 
              



s
s γ
ttt
γ
dtcuacuθtEdtcubcuθtE
0 0
0
0
0 limexplimexp  
        


s
s
t dtaθtEdtbθtE
0
00 expexp  
                                                   
2 The idea of a rationally chosen Pareto inefficient path was originally presented by Harashima (2004b). 
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         

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






s
s s s
r
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          



s s s
r
qrt drdqibθsEdtbθtE
0 0
00 expexpexp  
          0e x pe x pe x p
0
0   
s s
t
qt dtdqitsθbθsE  , 
 
because, if  st 0 , then θit   and    
s
t
q dqitsθ expexp . Hence, because   tsθ exp  

s
t
q dqiexp ,     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE  for sufficiently small γ.               ■ 
 
  Second, the opposite special case (i.e., a utility function with a sufficiently large γ) is 
examined.  
 
Lemma 2: If   γγ 0  is sufficiently large and if 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
, then  JaloneE0  
  00 NJtogetherE . 
Proof: Because 
tb0 , then  
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for any period  st  . On the other hand, because a0 , then for any period  st  , if 
1lim0 
 c
a
γ
,  
 
      














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

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γ
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a
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c
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1
1
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1
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Thus,  
 
                         N J t o g e t h e rEJ a l o n eE
c
γ
γγ
001
1
lim 


 
      dtcubcuθt
c
γ
ttt
γ
s
γγ



  limexp
1
lim
01
 
                         dtcuacuθt
c
γ
γsγγ





  limexp
1
lim
1
 
                   00   . 
 
Because 0
1
1


γc
γ
 for any   γγ 1 , then if 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
,    NJtogetherEJaloneE 00   
< 0 for sufficiently large  γ .                                               ■ 
 
The condition 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
 indicates that path NJ from c0 to c  deviates sufficiently from 
the posterior Pareto efficient saddle path and reaches the posterior steady state c  not taking 
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much time. Because steady states are irrelevant to the degree of risk aversion (γ), both c0 and c  
are irrelevant to γ.  
 By Lemmas 1 and 2, it can be proved that     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE  is 
possible. 
 
Lemma 3: If 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
, then there is a    γγ 0  such that if  γγ , 
    000  NJtogetherEJaloneE . 
Proof: If  0γ  is sufficiently small, then     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE  by Lemma 1, 
and if  γ  is sufficiently large and if 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
, then    NJtogetherEJaloneE 00   
0  by Lemma 2. Hence, if 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
, there is a certain    γγ 0  such that, if 
 γγ , then     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE .                                ■ 
 
  However,     000  NJaloneEJtogetherE  because both Jtogether and NJalone 
indicate that all the other households choose option J; thus, the values of it and kt are the same as 
those when all households proceed on the posterior Pareto efficient saddle path. Faced with 
these it and kt, deviating alone from the Pareto efficient path (NJalone) gives a lower expected 
utility than Jtogether to the NJ household. Both Jalone and NJtogether indicate that all the other 
households choose option NJ and it and kt are not those of the Pareto efficient path. Hence, the 
sign of    NJtogetherEJaloneE 00   varies depending on the conditions, as Lemma 3 
indicates.  
  By Lemma 3 and the property     000  NJaloneEJtogetherE , the possibility of 
the choice of a Pareto inefficient transition path, that is,     000  NJEJE , is shown. 
 
Proposition 1: If 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
 and  γγ , then there is a  10   pp  such that if 
*pp  ,     000  NJEJE , and if 
*pp  ,     000  NJEJE . 
Proof: By Lemma 3, if  γγ , then     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE  and  JtogetherE0  
  00  NJaloneE . By equations (5) and (6),  
 
         NJaloneEJtogetherEpNJEJE 0000         NJtogetherEJaloneEp 001   . 
 
Thus, if 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
 and  γγ ,     NJEJE
p
00
0
lim 

    000  NJtogetherEJaloneE  
and          0lim 0000
1


NJaloneEJtogetherENJEJE
p
. Hence, by the intermediate value 
theorem, there is  10   pp  such that if *pp  ,     000  NJEJE  and if *pp  , 
    000  NJEJE .                                                             ■ 
 
Proposition 1 indicates that, if 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
,  γγ , and p < p
*
, then the choice of option 
NJ gives the higher expected utility than that of option J to a household; that is, a household 
may make the rational choice of taking a Pareto inefficient transition path. The lemmas and 
proposition require no friction, so a Pareto inefficient transition path can be chosen even in a 
frictionless economy. This result is very important because it offers counter-evidence against 
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the conjecture that households never rationally choose a Pareto inefficient transition path in a 
frictionless economy. 
 
2.2.1.2  Conditions for a rational Pareto inefficient path 
The proposition requires several conditions. Among them,  γγ  may appear rather strict. 
If γ* is very large, path NJ will rarely be chosen. However, if path NJ is such that consumption 
is reduced sharply after the shock, the NJ option yields a higher expected utility than the J 
option even though γ is very small. For example, for any   γγ 0 , 
 
             N J t o g e t h e rEJ a l o n eE
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0
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1
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0cc  . That is, for 
each combination of path NJ and γ, there is  0s  such that, if  ss , then  JaloneE0  
  00  NJtogetherE . 
  Consider an example in which path NJ is such that bt is constant and bbt  before s 
(Figure 3); thus,  
s
t bsbE
0
0
. In this NJ path, consumption is reduced more sharply than it is 
in the case shown in Figure 2. In this case, because  
s
t bθsbθEa
0
0
, γ0 , and ts cc   
for st  , then                ss
ss
ttt cubcudtθtEdtcubcuθtE
0
0
0
0 expexp  
      ss cubcu
θ
θs
E 
 exp1
0
, and in addition,        

s
dtcuacuθtE exp0  
                    cubθscu
θ
θs
Ecuacu
θ
θs
EcuacudtθtE
s





 expexp
exp 000 . 
Hence, 
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s
s
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As γ increases, the ratio 
   
   bθscucu
cubcu ss


 decreases; thus, larger values of s can satisfy 
    000  NJtogetherEJaloneE . For example, suppose that c = 10, cs = 10.2, b = 0.3, and θ 
= 0.05. If 1γ , then s
*
 = 1.5 at the minimum, and if 5γ , then s
*
 = 6.8 at the minimum. This 
result implies that, if option NJ is such that consumption is reduced relatively sharply after the 
shock (e.g., bbt  ) and 
*pp  , option NJ will usually be chosen. Choosing option NJ is not a 
special case observed only if γ is very large, but option NJ can normally be chosen when the 
value of γ is within usually observed values. Conditions for generating a rational Pareto 
inefficient transition path therefore are not strict. In a recession, consumption usually declines 
sharply after the shock, which suggests that households have chosen the NJ option. 
 
2.3  Nash equilibrium 
2.3.1  A Nash equilibrium consisting of NJ strategies  
A household strategically determines whether to choose the J or NJ option, considering other 
households’ choices. All households know that each of them forms expectations about the 
future values of its utility and makes a decision in the same manner. Since all households are 
identical, the best response of each household is identical. Suppose that there are  NΗ   
identical households in the economy where H is sufficiently large (as assumed in Section 2.1). 
Let  10  ηη qq  be the probability that a household  Ηη   chooses option J. The average 
utility of the other households almost equals that of all households because H is sufficiently 
large. Hence, the average expected utilities of the other households that choose the J and NJ 
options are E0(Jtogether) and E0(NJtogether), respectively. Hence, the payoff matrix of the 
Η-dimensional symmetric mixed strategy game can be described as shown in Table 1. Each 
identical household determines its behavior on the basis of this payoff matrix.  
 In this mixed strategy game, the strategy profiles  
 
 (q1,q2,…,qH) = {(1,1,…,1), (
*** ,...,, ppp ), (0,0,…,0)}             (12) 
 
are Nash equilibria for the following reason. By Proposition 1, the best response of household η 
is J (i.e., qη = 1) if 
*pp  , indifferent between J and NJ (i.e., any  10,qη  ) if 
*pp  , and NJ 
(i.e., qη = 0) if 
*pp  . Because all households are identical, the best-response correspondence 
of each household is identical such that qη = 1 if 
*pp  , [0,1] if *pp  , and 0 if *pp   for 
any household Ηη . Hence, the mixed strategy profiles (1, 1,…,1), ( *** ,...,, ppp ), and 
(0,0,…,0) are the intersections of the graph of the best-response correspondences of all 
households. The Pareto efficient saddle path solution (1,1,…,1) (i.e., Jtogether) is a pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium, but a Pareto inefficient transition path (0,0,…,0) ( i.e., NJtogether) is 
also a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In addition, there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium 
( *** ,...,, ppp ).  
 
2.3.2  Selection of equilibrium 
Determining which Nash equilibrium, either NJtogether (0,0,…,0) or Jtogether (1,1,…,1), is 
dominant requires refinements of the Nash equilibrium, which necessitate additional criteria. 
Here, if households have a risk-averse preference in the sense that they avert the worst scenario 
when its probability is not known, households suppose a very low p and select the NJtogether 
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(0,0,…,0) equilibrium. Because 
 
               NJaloneEJaloneE 00   
               dtacuacuθtdtcubcuθtE s
s
ttttt 


0
0
ˆexpexp  
                         


s
s
ttt dtcuacuθtdtcubcuθtE
0
0 expexp  
              000  N J t o g e t h e rEJ a l o n eE  ,                                (13) 
 
by Lemma 3, Jalone is the worst choice in terms of the amount of payoff, followed by 
NJtogether, and NJalone, and Jtogether is the best. The outcomes of choosing option J are more 
dispersed than those of option NJ. If households have a risk-averse preference in the 
above-mentioned sense and avert the worst scenario when they have no information on its 
probability, a household will prefer the less dispersed option (NJ), fearing the worst situation 
that the household alone substantially increases consumption while the other households 
substantially decrease consumption after the shock. This behavior is rational because it is 
consistent with preferences. Because all households are identical and know inequality (13), all 
households will equally suppose that they all prefer the less dispersed NJ option; therefore, all 
of them will suppose a very low p, particularly 0p , and select the NJtogether (0,0,…,0) 
equilibrium, which is the Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path. Thereby, unlike most 
multiple equilibria models, the problem of indeterminacy does not arise, and “animal spirits” 
(e.g., pessimism or optimism) are unnecessary to explain the selection. 
 
2.4  Amplified generation of unutilized resources 
A Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path successively generates unutilized products (bt). 
They are left unused, discarded, or preemptively not produced during the path. Unused or 
discarded goods and services indicate a decline in sales and an increase in inventory for firms. 
Preemptively suspended production results in an increase in unemployment and idle capital. As 
a result, profits decline and some parts of firms need to be liquidated, which is unnecessary if 
the economy proceeds on the J path (i.e., the posterior Pareto efficient path). If the liquidation is 
implemented immediately after the shock, bt will no longer be generated, but such a liquidation 
would generate a tremendous shock. The process of the liquidation, however, will take time 
because of various frictions, and excess capital that generates bt will remain for a long period. 
During the period when capital is not reduced to the posterior steady-state level, unutilized 
products are successively generated. In a period, bt is generated and eliminated, but in the next 
period, another, new, bt is generated and eliminated. This cycle is repeated in every period 
throughout the transition path, and it implies that demand is lower than supply in every period. 
This phenomenon may be interpreted as a general glut or a persisting disequilibrium by some 
definitions of equilibrium. 
 
2.5  Time preference shock as the exceptional shock 
Not all shocks result in a Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path. If anything, this type of 
shock is limited because such a shock needs to force consumption to fluctuate very jaggedly to 
maintain Pareto efficiency. A Pareto inefficient path is preferred, because these substantially 
jagged fluctuations can be averted. An upward time preference shock is one shock that 
necessitates a substantially jagged fluctuation as shown in Figure 1. Other examples are rare 
because shocks that do not change the steady state (e.g., monetary shocks) are not relevant. One 
other example is technology regression, which would move the vertical line 0
dt
dct  to the left 
in Figure 1 and necessitate a jagged consumption path to keep Pareto efficiency. In this sense, 
technology and time preference shocks have similar effects on economic fluctuations. However, 
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a technology regression also simultaneously moves the curve 0
dt
dkt  downwards, and 
accordingly, the Pareto efficient saddle path also moves downwards. Therefore, the jagged 
consumption is smoothed out to some extent. As a result, the substantially jagged consumption 
that can generate a recession would require a large-scale, sudden, and sharp regression in 
technology, which does not seem very likely. An upward time preference shock, however, only 
moves the vertical line 0
dt
dct  to the left. 
  In some macro-economic models with multiple equilibria, changing equilibria may 
necessitate substantially jagged consumption to keep Pareto optimality. There are many types of 
multiple equilibra models that depend on various types of increasing returns, externalities, or 
complementarities, but they are vulnerable to a number of criticisms (e.g., insufficient 
explanation of the switching mechanism; see, e.g., Morris and Shin, 2001). Examining the 
properties, validity, and plausibility of each of these many and diverse models is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
 
3. MONETARY POLICY 
 
3.1  Irresponsive monetary policy 
As argued in Section 1, a feature of a liquidity trap is that households and firms are irresponsive 
to monetary policies. Here, monetary policy is defined as the policy of the monetary authority to 
manipulate nominal interest rates by intervening in financial markets. On a Nash equilibrium of 
a Pareto inefficient path, monetary policies are naturally irresponsive because, unless a  is 
made substantially small, households’ choice of the NJ path does not change. Through the use 
of monetary policies, it is difficult to make a  substantially small. Households and firms 
rationally determine their behaviors on the basis of their expectations of a future economic path 
from now until an indefinite future. If monetary policies cannot affect expectations about the NJ 
path, they will be useless.  
 Suppose that the real interest rate it is lowered by monetary policies, and thus a  in 
equation (9) becomes smaller. If  
 
  



  
s s
r
qr drdqibθEaE
0
exp  
 
becomes substantially small or negative, households may switch from the NJ path to the J path 
based on the same strategic calculations shown in Section 2. However, there is a critical point 
 *aE  such that, for a given γ~  (  γγ ~ ), if    *aEaE  , then households will not 
switch to the J path. The proof is almost same as that given in Proposition 1. In essence, 
whatever the monetary policies are, the paths of consumption, investments, and production will 
be unchanged unless  aE  is made less than  *aE . 
 It is, however, very difficult to make  aE  less than  *aE  because 

s
r drbθ
0
(i.e., the main component of a ) cannot be affected by monetary policies and 

s
r
q dqiexp cannot be made substantially small even if i is lowered by monetary policies. For 
example, if i is lowered from 0.03 to 0.02 by monetary policies for 10 years, 
10
0
exp dqiq is 
reduced from 1.34 to 1.22 (i.e., only by 9.3%), and if from i = 0.03 to 0.01, 
10
0
exp dqiq is 
from 1.34 to 1.10 (by 18%). Hence, even if monetary authorities can successfully lower i for a 
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long period,  aE  cannot be made substantially small. An exception is the case in which 
monetary authorities can make long-term real interest rates substantially negative for a long 
period. Nevertheless, this case is generally very unlikely and actually has not been historically 
observed in the modern era.  
 In addition, it is debatable whether the monetary authority can artificially hold the real 
interest rate substantially below the marginal product of capital for a long period. Many 
economists agree that monetary policies can affect the real interest rate in the short-run by 
manipulating nominal interest rates, but many of them do not agree that they can do so in the 
long-run. The real interest rate is basically determined to be equal to the marginal product of 
capital in the long-run.  
 In sum, monetary policies usually do not have enough power to shift households from 
the NJ path to the J path. Even if aggressive monetary policies are taken, in the sense of almost 
zero nominal interest rates, the paths of consumption, investments, and production will remain 
unchanged, except in the unlikely case that the real interest rate is substantially negative for a 
long period. Because investments are unchanged even if nominal interest rate are very low, 
banks have difficulty in lending money corresponding to bt to firms. This therefore is not a 
credit crunch, but rather a “debt crunch.” This phenomenon may also be called “excess 
savings.” As a last resort, banks have to increase their purchases of government bonds.  
 
3.2  Unconventional monetary policies 
3.2.1  Effects on consumption and investments  
As shown in Section 3.1, an important feature of the so-called liquidity trap is that traditional 
monetary policy (i.e., manipulating nominal interest rates) is useless. However, some 
economists argue that an unconventional monetary policy (i.e., manipulating the quantity of 
money directly by the monetary authority) is still useful. In particular, they argue that by 
continuous injections of large amounts of money, the economy can eventually get out of a 
liquidity trap. However, how the quantity of money affects consumption, investments, and 
production is theoretically unclear. The Friedman rule (Friedman, 1969) indicates that money 
should be provided until demand for it is saturated and the quantity of money reaches its 
optimal level. Therefore, in this case, the nominal interest rate should be zero and the inflation 
rate should be negative.  
 The model in Section 2 indicates that unless households switch from the NJ path to the 
J path, the paths of consumption, investment, and production are unchanged. Therefore, unless 
unconventional monetary policies can make real interest rates substantially negative for a long 
period, households will not switch to the J path. However, it is highly unlikely that real interest 
rates can be kept substantially negative for a long period through the manipulation of the 
quantity of money. As a result, the model in Section 2 indicates that the unconventional 
monetary policy is also not useful.  
 
3.2.2  Excess money  
If the government is not benevolent but instead is economically Leviathan, the optimal quantity 
of money is not determined at the point where the nominal interest rate is zero. Harashima 
(2004b, 2008, 2013a) shows that inflation acceleration is not generated by an increasing money 
supply but instead by the gap of time preference rates between the Leviathan government and 
households. The optimal quantity of money is determined at the point where both the 
government and households can simultaneously satisfy their all optimality conditions. If a 
quantity of money over this optimal quantity is supplied, it is merely excess money and useless 
for households in the sense that they cannot satisfy all their optimality conditions.  
 
3.2.3  Equivalence to tax 
Because the NJ paths of consumption, investment, and production are unchanged by 
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unconventional monetary policy, the excess money that it injects into the economy is not spent 
on consumption and investment. Therefore, households and firms that possess the excess money 
are forced to buy government bonds that finance the money for buying bt, directly or indirectly 
via banks. As a result, the demand for government bonds will increase and the real rate of return 
on government bonds will decrease. Furthermore, if there is an insufficient amount of 
government bonds in financial markets, some households may not be able to purchase enough 
bonds and will have to unwillingly hold onto part of the excess money.  
 The unwillingly held excess money is practically equivalent to seigniorage. Because 
seigniorage is a type of tax, this excess money represents a tax increase. The lowered real rate of 
return on government bonds resulting from this excess money can also be interpreted as a kind 
of tax imposed on the return. The revenue from these taxes is used to finance the money used to 
buy bt. Hence, the question of what effects unconventional monetary policies have resolves 
itself into the question of whether taxes or borrowing should be used for utilizing bt. Adopting 
unconventional monetary policy in essence means that taxes have been chosen.  
 
3.2.4  Possible divergence of the bonds’ interest rate from marginal 
productivity 
Usually, the real rate of return on government bonds is kept equal to the marginal product of 
capital by arbitrage if other factors (e.g., transaction costs, risk premium, depreciation rate, etc.) 
are neglected. However, as shown above, the excess money lowers the real rate of return on 
government bonds, and it may become lower than the marginal product of capital. This 
divergence will not be corrected by arbitrage because the economy is on the NJ path. The paths 
of consumption and investments in capital are unchanged by the excess money; thus, firms do 
not increase investments in capital. Hence, there is no room for firms to exploit opportunities 
provided by the excess money by investing more in capital. As a result, households and firms 
have to buy government bonds for utilizing bt even though their rate of return is lower than the 
marginal product of capital. This divergence is rational. Conversely, the real rate of return on 
government bonds is not necessarily a good proxy variable for the marginal product of capital if 
an economy is on the NJ path.  
 
4. FISCAL POLICY 
 
4.1  Pareto efficiency  
4.1.1  Pareto improvement 
The fiscal policy examined in this paper is one in which bt is bought and utilized by the 
government, and the government’s expenditure is financed by increases in taxes or borrowing. 
For simplicity, it is assumed that the tax is a lump-sum tax and the borrowing is accomplished 
by issuing government bonds.  
 As was the case with monetary policies, this fiscal policy generally does not have the 
power to force a switch from the NJ path to the J path because the expected utilities of Jalone, 
NJtogether, Jtogether, and NJtogether are basically not affected by the policy. An increase in 
the lump-sum tax will cause consumption to decrease equally across households regardless of 
the paths taken. Therefore, the expected utilities for the four paths will decrease similarly by the 
amount of the tax increase; thus, Proposition 1 is basically held. In addition, an increase in 
borrowing will not make the real interest rate substantially negative for a long period. Rather, it 
may raise nominal interest rates and then, in the short run, the real interest rate may also rise. 
Hence, an increase in borrowing will not make a  substantially small; thus, the path will not 
switch from NJ to J as a result of fiscal policy.  
 Nevertheless, fiscal policy is very effective in the sense that unused resources are 
utilized. That is, the use of fiscal policy will improve Pareto efficiency, but the argument that 
Pareto efficiency is improved is not simple. Keynes (1936) argued that it was better for the 
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government to pay people to dig holes in the ground and then fill them up to decrease 
unemployment than doing nothing. But does this policy improve Pareto efficiency? To answer 
this question, we first need to examine how the government’s behaviors are determined.  
 
4.1.2  Two different views on government behavior  
There are two extremely different views regarding government behavior in the literature on 
political economy: the Leviathan view and the benevolent view (e.g., Downs 1957; Brennan and 
Buchanan 1980; Alesina and Cukierman 1990). From an economic point of view, a benevolent 
government maximizes the expected economic utility of the representative household, but a 
Leviathan government does not. Whereas the expenditure of a benevolent government is a tool 
used to maximize the economic utility of the representative household, the expenditure of a 
Leviathan government is a tool used to achieve the government’s own policy objectives.3 For 
example, if a Leviathan government considers national security to be the most important 
political issue, defense spending will increase greatly, but if improving social welfare is the top 
political priority, spending on social welfare will increase dramatically, even though the 
increased expenditures may not necessarily increase the economic utility of the representative 
household. 
 The Leviathan view generally requires the explicit inclusion of government 
expenditures, tax revenues, and related activities in the government’s political utility function 
(e.g., Edwards and Keen 1996). Because an economically Leviathan government derives 
political utility from expenditure for its political purposes, the government will be happier as 
expenditures increase. But raising tax rates will provoke people’s antipathy, which increases the 
probability of being replaced by an opposing party that also nearly represents the median 
household. Thus, an economically Leviathan government regards taxes as necessary costs to 
obtain the freedom of expenditure for its own purposes. The government therefore will derive 
utility from expenditure and disutility from taxation. Expenditure and taxes in the political 
utility function of the government are analogous to consumption and labor hours in the 
economic utility function of the representative household. Consumption and labor hours are 
both control variables, and as such, the government’s expenditure and tax revenues are also 
control variables. As a whole, the political utility function of an economically Leviathan 
government can be expressed as uG(gt, xt) where gt and xt are the government’s expenditure and 
tax revenues in period t, respectively. In addition, it can be assumed on the basis of the 
previously mentioned arguments that 0
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. An economically Leviathan government therefore maximizes the expected sum 
of these utilities discounted by its time preference rate under the constraint of deficit financing. 
 
4.1.3  The benevolent view and bt 
A benevolent government behaves to maximize the utility of households. Because the economy 
is on the NJ path, private consumption of households does not change as a result of fiscal policy. 
If the expenditure to utilize bt increases the provision of public goods, however, households’ 
consumption of public goods increases and their utilities also increase. Hence, the government’s 
use of bt improves Pareto efficiency.   
 However, there is a problem with this benevolent view. It justifies the fiscal policy 
because it increases public goods, but the most important motive of a government in adopting 
                                                   
3 The government behavior assumed in the fiscal theory of the price level reflects an aspect of a 
Leviathan government. Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000) argue that non-Ricardian policies correspond 
to the type of policies in which governments are viewed as selecting policies and committing 
themselves to those policies in advance of prices being determined in markets. 
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fiscal policies is not to increase the consumption of public goods but to decrease unemployment 
during a recession. Increasing the consumption of public goods is only a tool that is being used 
to decrease unemployment. Actually, a government will adopt the fiscal policy to make 
unemployment decrease regardless of an increase in public goods. However, the benevolent 
view justifies an increase in public goods even though employment does not increase. The 
benevolent view therefore is not necessarily consistent with the motive of government.  
 It may be argued that, if an originally unemployed household member becomes 
employed as a result of the fiscal policy, the household’s welfare will improve; thus, the fiscal 
policy can be directly linked to a reduction in unemployment, but this is not true. Suppose that 
the stochastic process of unemployment is described as a Markov chain, and its stationary 
distribution is equal to all identical households. As a result of fiscal policies, originally 
unemployed household members become employed, and the average income of all households 
increases. However, this increased income is taken away through increased taxes or borrowing 
by the government to finance the increased expenditures. As a result, the path of private 
consumption is unchanged regardless of unemployment rate. Hence, lowering the 
unemployment rate does not directly improve Pareto efficiency. Pareto efficiency is only 
improved if the provision of public goods increases. Therefore, the theoretical fiscal policy of 
employing people to dig holes and fill them up, which Keynes supported, is meaningless from 
the benevolent point of view.  
 
4.1.4  The Leviathan view and bt 
The Leviathan view is consistent with the motive of government. The expenditure to reduce 
unemployment directly increases a Leviathan government’s utility regardless of households’ 
utilities or the usefulness of increased public goods. Because people’s political desires are 
directly reflected in the government’s utility, materialization of their desires, for example, a 
significant reduction in unemployment, greatly increases the government’s utility. An increase 
in the government’s utility improves Pareto efficiency. Hence, unlike the benevolent view, the 
policy of employing people to dig holes and fill them up is justified from the Leviathan point of 
view.  
 Not only is the Leviathan view consistent with the motive of government, it is also 
highly likely that the view actually prevails because a government is generally chosen by 
median households under a proportional representation system (e.g., Downs, 1957), whereas the 
representative household usually presumed in the economics literature is the mean household. 
The economically representative household is not usually identical to the politically 
representative household, and a majority of people could support a Leviathan government even 
if they know that the government does not necessarily pursue only the economic objectives of 
the economically representative household. In other words, the government presented here is an 
economically Leviathan government that maximizes the political utility of people, whereas the 
conventional economically benevolent government maximizes the economic utility of people. In 
addition, because the politically and economically representative households are different (the 
median and mean households, respectively), the preferences of future governments will also be 
similarly different from those of the mean representative household. In this sense, the current 
and future governments presented in the model can be seen as a combined government that goes 
on indefinitely; that is, the economically Leviathan government always represents the median 
representative household. 
 
4.2  Artificial jump to the new saddle path 
If the government completely utilizes bt, the total demand in the economy, that is, the sum of 
private consumption, investments, and government expenditure, is exactly equal to production 
(the total supply). There is no excess demand or supply. Because bt is completely utilized by the 
government, the economy jumps to the new saddle path (the J path) from the NJ path. 
Households, however, still proceed on the NJ path. The path households choose is, in essence, 
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artificially and compulsorily corrected by the government’s fiscal policy. 
 Another important feature is that even though the government’s expenditure is 
financed by borrowing, the fiscal policies have no negative effect on capital formation. Capital 
is adjusted to the level of the new steady state regardless of government borrowing. The path of 
investment is predetermined before the fiscal policy is implemented. Conversely, the fiscal 
policy also has no “positive” effect on capital formation in the sense that it does not increase 
investments above the level on the NJ path.  
 Note that the above argument is based on the assumption that the government has a 
firm will to tax households after period s to pay for the borrowing used to finance the policy to 
utilize bt. If the government behaves in this manner, the extra debt accumulated does not matter, 
even though the ratio of the government’s debts to GDP can become very high before period s. 
 
4.3  Increased taxes or borrowing 
Increases in tax revenues and borrowing are the choices available to finance the money needed 
to utilize bt. If the Barro–Ricardo equivalence theorem holds, households are indifferent to both 
forms of financing. The government, however, may not necessarily be indifferent. The expected 
utility of government will vary depending on the functional form of its utility function.  
 
4.3.1  The Leviathan government’s alternatives 
Suppose that the government is Leviathan and its expenditure is gt, the lump-sum tax revenue is 
xt, and its borrowing is ΔBt in period t. The Leviathan government’s utility function is  
 
uG(gt, xt) , 
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where γg and γx are constant. It is also assumed that, before the shock, xt, ΔBt, and gt are constant 
for any period; that is, they are steady state or, so to speak, permanent values. The permanent 
expenditure gt is financed by xt and ΔBt in each period such that  
 
gt = xt + ΔBt . 
 
Because of the inclusion of government in the model, households’ private consumption is 
smaller by gt than that in models without government (Fig. 4). Suppose that, after the shock, the 
NJ path is selected and a fiscal policy to completely utilize bt is implemented. Let the 
government’s extra expenditure to utilize bt, its extra lump-sum tax, and its extra borrowing to 
finance the expenditure in the period t be gb,t, xb,t and ΔBb,t respectively. Therefore, after the 
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shock, the total expenditure of the government, the total tax revenue, and the total borrowing in 
period t before period s are gt + gb,t, xt + xb,t and ΔBt + ΔBb,t, respectively. Hence, after the shock,  
 
gt + gb,t = xt + xb,t +ΔBt + ΔBb,t             (14) 
 
in period t before s; thus, gb,t = xb,t + ΔBb,t.  
 If only a tax increase is used to finance gb,t, then equation (14) degenerates to  
 
 gt + gb,t = xt + xb,t + ΔBt , 
 
before period s, and after s, to 
 
 gt = xt + ΔBt . 
 
If only an increase in borrowing is used, then equation (14) degenerates to 
 
gt + gb,t = xt + ΔBt + ΔBb,t 
 
before period s, and after s, to 
 
 gt + ga,t = xt + a + ΔBt , 
 
where ga,t is the extra expenditure to pay for interest of the accumulated extra government bonds 
ΔBb,t. a , which is shown in equation (9), here indicates the extra tax revenue. Because bt is 
completely utilized, the accumulated extra government bonds can be expressed as   
 
 
s s
r
qr drdqib
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exp , 
 
and the real interest rate after period s is equal to θ; thus, a is equal to ga,t. That is, the 
government imposes an extra tax to pay for ga,t.  
 In addition, tax cuts can be combined with an increase in borrowing. Particularly, the 
following case is examined:  
 
 gt + gb,t - Δgt = gt = xt - Δxt + ΔBt + ΔBb,t 
 
before the period s, and after s, 
 
 gt + ga,t = xt + a + ΔBt , 
 
where Δgt is a reduction in permanent expenditure and Δgt, = gb,t, and Δxt is the amount of the 
tax cuts and Δgt = Δxt. In this case, the government increases expenditure by gb,t as the fiscal 
policy, but at the same time, it reduces permanent expenditure by Δgt. As a result, the total 
expenditure is unchanged even though the fiscal policy has been adopted, and the reduced 
expenditure Δgt is used to finance tax cuts Δxt.   
 
4.3.2  The expected utility of a Leviathan government 
If only an increase in tax is used to finance the utilization of bt, the government’s expected 
utility is  
 
        


s
ttGG
s
b,ttb,ttGG dt,xgutθdtG,xGgutθU expexp
0
1
 ; 
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if only an increase in borrowing is used, it is  
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and if tax cuts and borrowing are combined as shown above, it is  
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 If U2 > U1, then financing by increased borrowing is preferred to that by increased 
taxes. Here,  
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By the same procedure as used in Proposition 1 and Lemmas 1, 2, and 3, there is 
  ** 0 xx γγ  such that if  xx γγ* , then  
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that is, U2 < U1. Conversely, if γx is sufficiently small, then U2 > U1 and an increase in 
borrowing is preferred. A small γx indicates that the disutility per unit of tax does not largely 
diminish as the amount of tax decreases.  
 Next, if U3 > U1, then a combination of tax cuts and borrowing is preferred to the tax 
increase. Here,  
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same procedure as used in Proposition 1 and Lemmas 1, 2, and 3, there is   **** 0 xx γγ  
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In addition, similarly, there is   *** 0 gg γγ  such that if  gg γγ ** , then U3 – U1 < 0. 
Conversely, if γx and/or γg is sufficiently small, then U3 – U1 > 0. In these cases, the combination 
of tax cuts and borrowing is preferred.  
 Finally, if U3 > U2, then the combination of tax cuts and increased borrowing is 
preferred to only an increase in borrowing. Here,  
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, then U3 – U2 < 0; that is, the fiscal policy consisting only of an increase in 
borrowing is preferred to that consisting only of a combination of tax cuts and increased 
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4.3.3  A shift of government’s preferences 
The values of γg and γx are empirical questions. However, they may decrease when bt is 
generated. A shock that generates bt will cause the preferences of a Leviathan government (i.e., 
political desires of the median household) to shift because the existence of extra unemployment 
is significantly unacceptable for the government. The representative household will not perceive 
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economic disutility from extra unemployment as a result of bt because its consumption (i.e., the 
average consumption of all households) does not change. However, the increased possibility of 
unemployment resulting from bt will significantly affect the political perception of individual 
households. Although fears of being unemployed will not affect the economic utility derived 
from consumption, it will have physiological and political effects. Being unemployed may 
substantially change the course of a person’s life. An unemployed person may have to 
unwillingly and greatly change his or her plans. Uncertainty about various elements of life will 
substantially increase. Although these kinds of physiological and political disutilities are not 
reflected in economic disutility, they will have a large impact on people’s political behaviors, 
and the political desires of the median household will be substantially affected. Hence, the 
values of γg and γx may shift as a result of a shock that generates bt. 
 In response to the increased and very strong fear of unemployment, a Leviathan 
government’s political desires to increase government expenditures to finance the utilization of 
bt to decrease extra unemployment will be very strong. Therefore, far more expenditures will be 
preferred by the government when bt is generated. In addition, an increase in taxes when bt is 
generated will be seen as a measure that worsens unemployment so a tax increase will be far 
less preferred when bt is generated as compared to when it is not. Such changes in the 
government’s preferences induced by the shock suggest that the values of γg and γx will become 
significantly small if bt is generated. As stated in Section 4.3.2, if such shifts in preferences 
actually occur, the government will prefer to increase borrowing over tax increases to finance 
the expenditures for utilizing bt. 
 
5  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Keynes’ and his early followers’ explanations of persistent large amounts of unused resources 
have come to be viewed as basically unacceptable because they have no micro-foundation. In 
addition, New-Keynesian explanations based on micro-founded mechanisms of some kinds of 
price rigidity have not been regarded as sufficiently successful because price rigidity has been 
criticized for its fragile theoretical (micro-) foundation and its inability to explain the persistent 
nature of inflation. In this paper, I present a mechanism based on the model in Harashima 
(2004a, 2012, 2013b). An essential part of this mechanism is that a Nash equilibrium can 
conceptually coexist with Pareto inefficiency.  
 A Nash equilibrium consisting of strategies of choosing a Pareto inefficient transition 
path of consumption to the steady state exists because households are intrinsically risk averse 
and not cooperative. In a strategic environment, this generates the possibility that, if 
consumption needs to be substantially and discontinuously increased to keep Pareto optimality, 
a non-cooperative household’s strategy to deviate from the Pareto optimal path gives a higher 
expected utility than the strategy of choosing the Pareto optimal path. Such a strategic situation 
is generated when the rate of time preference shifts upwards.  
 The effects of monetary and fiscal policies when an economy is on a Nash equilibrium 
of a Pareto inefficient path were also explored. The results indicate that, although Keynes’ 
prescription for escaping a liquidity trap (i.e., the use of fiscal policy) was right, his explanation 
for it was wrong. Monetary policies are useless during periods known as liquidity traps because 
they do not have enough power to shift a Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path to that of 
a Pareto efficient path. Fiscal policy can fill the gap between the Pareto efficient and inefficient 
paths and thus improve Pareto efficiency without affecting capital formation. The economy 
essentially jumps to the new Pareto efficient saddle path as a result of the fiscal policy. As a tool 
to finance fiscal policies, households are indifferent to the choice of tax increases and borrowing 
as the method of financing the additional expenditures if the Barro–Ricardo equivalence 
theorem holds. However, if the government is economically Leviathan, it will generally prefer 
to increase borrowing over raising taxes.  
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Figure 2: The paths of Jalone and NJalone 
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Figure 3: A Pareto inefficient transition path 
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Table 1  The payoff matrix 
 
              Any other household 
  J  NJ  
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 A
       
J  E0(Jtogether), E0(Jtogether) E0(Jalone), E0(NJtogether) 
      
NJ  E0(NJalone), E0(Jtogether) E0(NJtogether), E0(NJtogether) 
 
 
